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STUDENT SPEECH ONLINE: A MATTER OF PUBLIC
CONCERN
Eric Hogrefe*
Abstract—The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mahanoy Area
School District v. B. L. ex rel. Levy partially answered the long-standing
question of when schools can police student speech that takes place online.
But Mahanoy largely ignored decades of scholarship, and opinions by lower
courts, all of which assumed online speech was governed by the Court’s
earlier student speech cases—especially the seminal Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.
This Note argues that Mahanoy and Tinker are consistent with each
other, and both are consistent with the Court’s decisions governing another
distinctive kind of speech: public employee speech. It introduces a
framework for online student speech that is based on the framework for
public employee speech, one focused on official duties and public concern.
By grounding student speech in the public employee framework, I harmonize
Mahanoy’s idiosyncratic approach with established law.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mahanoy Area
School District v. B. L. ex rel. Levy went part of the way toward clarifying
when schools can police students’ online speech without offending the First
*

Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2022.

307

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Amendment.1 The Court considered whether a school district could punish a
cheerleader who, after failing to make the varsity squad, posted a Snapchat
story from an off-campus location.2 The post was laced with profanity and
was critical of the school’s cheerleading program.3 In an 8-1 decision, the
Court held that the school could not punish the student. 4 Although they
declined to announce a single rule governing student speech online, the Court
articulated three broad principles for lower courts to consider in future cases:
(1) most off-campus speech should be controlled by parents rather than
schools, (2) courts should be skeptical of allowing schools to regulate offcampus speech because that would empower them to regulate all student
speech during the 24-hour day, and (3) schools have an interest in protecting
their students’ unpopular speech.5
The Mahanoy decision, however, is curiously untethered from
precedent. In the five paragraphs Justice Breyer uses to articulate the three
principles, he includes no citations whatsoever.6 Breyer only contends with
the Court’s earlier decisions about student speech in passages rejecting the
Third Circuit’s reasoning below, and when rejecting several arguments
raised by the parties.7 But the applicability of those foundational cases to
future online speech is not clear from the three announced principles.
Student speech that takes place in school is governed largely by a body
of law that never anticipated school without a corporeal schoolhouse. The
Supreme Court’s 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District contemplates a physical “schoolhouse gate” marking the
threshold between general free speech protections and a specific version of
free speech enjoyed by students.8 With no threshold—no schoolhouse gate—
does Tinker still apply? And if so, how does it apply?
Tinker’s applicability to internet speech was hotly debated prior to
Mahanoy.9 A large body of legal scholarship offering new and responsive
frameworks to online student speech emerged, theorizing Tinker’s
“schoolhouse gate” but without a physical school.10 Off-campus speech, for
1

Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (2021).
Id. at 2043.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 2048.
5
Id. at 2046.
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., id. at 2047–48 (rejecting three arguments citing earlier student speech cases).
8
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
9
See infra Part II.
10
See, e.g., Watt Lesley Black, Jr. & Elizabeth A. Shaver, The First Amendment, Social Media, and
the Public Schools: Emergent Themes and Unanswered Questions, 20 NEV. L.J. 1 (2019); Michael K.
Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus
2
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many, became a matter of on-campus effect.11 This pre-Mahanoy scholarship
could not have envisioned the extent to which the Court’s first statement
about online student speech would ignore their own precedent about inschool speech.
In fact, Mahanoy bears more resemblance to the Court’s precedent
governing public employee speech than student speech. Like those cases,
Mahanoy’s seemingly lenient principles suggest that schools will need to
evaluate online speech for its effects on members of the community—and
their ability to perform their roles within that community—before
administrators can dole out any discipline. Similarly, public employees are
subject to a series of tests to determine whether their speech falls within their
official duties, and whether it addresses a matter of public concern.12
This Note argues that the analogy to public employee speech represents
a viable and preferable alternative to Tinker as an avenue for grounding
online student speech in Supreme Court precedent. Reconfiguring the public
employee speech framework for student speech maintains much of Tinker’s
spirit, while avoiding Tinker’s focus on geography.
In Part I, I explore the Tinker line of cases along with several attempts
to apply those cases to online speech. I aim to show that this framework is
unable to answer questions posed by the Internet, but also to show that it
implicitly relies on notions of duty and public concern—hallmarks of public
employee speech analysis. Part II addresses the pre-Mahanoy scholarship
surrounding online student speech, and the varying degrees of success
scholars have had updating student speech frameworks. Finally, Part III
introduces a proposed solution in the form of a reimagining of the public
employee framework for student speech. The proposed framework
harmonizes Mahanoy’s stated principles with Tinker’s underlying concerns,
while also incorporating specific Supreme Court precedent—albeit largely
from the public employee cases rather than the student speech cases.

Online Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405 (2016); Lindsay J. Gower, Note,
Blue Mountain School District v. J.S. Ex Rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court Provide Clarification for
Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet Speech?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 709 (2013); David L.
Hudson, Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV.
621 (2012).
11
See, e.g., Joe Towslee, The “Nexus” Test vs. the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Test: How OffCampus Student Speech Can Cause On-Campus Consequences, 13 IDAHO CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 1
(2019).
12
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–49 (1983) (refusing protection for public employee
speech that was in course of the employee’s official duties); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch.
Dist. 205, Will Cty., IL, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (upholding speech of a public-school teacher on the
basis that the speech was on a matter of public concern).
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I.

TINKER AND ONLINE SPEECH
A. The Tinker Test

Tinker involved a protest against the Vietnam War, a clue about its
applicability in the Internet Age. Three schoolchildren planned to wear black
armbands, signifying support for a truce in Vietnam, to school during the
holiday season.13 School officials became aware of the protest in advance
and implemented a policy against armbands, resulting in the students’
suspension. 14 The district court dismissed the complaint. 15 The Supreme
Court’s Opinion, delivered by Justice Fortas, is remembered largely for the
command: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”16 Recognizing that students’ free speech rights exist even
while in school, the Court required school officials to establish a reasonable
basis “to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities. . . .”17 The officials failed to meet this standard, and the
district court’s ruling was reversed and the case remanded.18
Tinker revealed the Court’s focus on individual duties in student speech
cases. The students in Tinker wore armbands, yes, but they also attended
class and carried out their other normal duties as students. If their own
conduct had taken them away from their normal duties as students, they
would have contributed to a disruption. In this sense, Tinker is much more
about the duties of various members of the campus community than it is
about a physical schoolhouse, its signature quote notwithstanding.
The Court’s opinion also focused on the political implications of the
students’ speech. Fortas quoted approvingly from West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette on “educating the young for citizenship,” and not
“strangl[ing] the free mind.”19 He warned that “state-operated schools may
not be enclaves of totalitarianism,”20 and he dutifully cited the “marketplace
of ideas.”21 The implication was clear: the Court would look favorably on
political speech, speech that might be described in a public employee context
as speech on a matter public concern.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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Tinker 393 U.S. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 512.
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Similar principles were at work in the Court’s other foundational
student speech opinion: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.22 There,
the court distinguished Tinker by upholding sanctions against a student who
had given an inuendo-laced speech supporting another student for student
council. In reversing the lower ruling, the Court pointed to the “marked
distinction between the political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the
sexual content of respondent’s speech in this case. . . .”23 The Court again
stressed the school’s responsibility to teach citizenship, managing to tie in
Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice and The Beards’ New
Basic History of the United States. 24 Since the speech at issue in Fraser
lacked the political import of the Tinker armbands, the Court reasoned, “it
was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the
point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent
with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”25
The Fraser Court maintained Tinker’s focus on the rights of other
school actors to perform their usual duties. In the Court’s opinion, Chief
Justice Berger quoted Tinker’s observation that the armbands did not affect
the “work of the schools or the rights of other students.”26 In both cases, the
Court considered whether student speech would cause a disruption in the
physical space of the schoolhouse. But the decision in both cases hinged less
on the physical location of the speech, and more on the effect that the speech
had on students, teachers, and administrators.
Despite their similarities, however, Tinker and Fraser clearly establish
two separate rationales for policing student speech. The Court’s analysis in
Fraser does not address Tinker’s substantial disruption.27 Instead, the two
frameworks each proceed from the notion that students’ constitutional rights
are constrained by the interest that administrators have to run their schools.28
Subsequent cases have extended Fraser’s analysis to school sponsored
newspapers 29 and to off-campus, school-sponsored trips. 30 In Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court considered whether a school district
could censor certain articles in the school newspaper.31 The Court upheld the
22

478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 680.
24
Id. at 681–82.
25
Id. at 685–86.
26
Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
27
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly
did not conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker.”).
28
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83.
29
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
30
See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
31
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 260.
23
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censorship, carving out another exception to Tinker for “school-sponsored
expressive activities [when] reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”32 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court considered schools’ ability to
police off-campus speech when students displayed a banner reading “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS” during a school-sponsored trip.33 The Court refused to apply
Tinker, reasoning that Fraser shows that “Tinker is not the only basis for
restricting student speech.”34
Online speech touches on all of the Supreme Court’s Tinker exceptions.
All online audiences are, in a sense, captive in that they have no warning that
a harmful post is harmful until they have read it. Online speech also has an
ambiguous relationship with a school’s curriculum: if all school is online,
which online speech is curricular, and which is not? Finally, as in Morse, the
physical boundary of the schoolhouse gate is no barrier to students who wish
to violate school rules during school-sponsored activities. All of these issues
necessitate a reimagining of Tinker’s underlying ideals into a framework that
anticipates the complexities of online learning.
B. Moving Tinker Online
Attempts to apply Tinker and its exceptions to online speech betray the
serious challenges posed by the Internet. Notably, the Supreme Court itself
has not offered any guidance about how its school speech jurisprudence
might apply to online speech affecting campus.
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, hearing the case en banc, refused to allow Blue Mountain
School District to suspend a middle school student who made an unflattering
MySpace profile mocking her school principal.35 The profile was a mixture
of sexually themed vulgarity and over-the-top absurdity, and it was firmly
rooted in the aesthetic sensibilities of a middle schooler.36
In deciding that the district could not punish this off-campus speech,
the court relied on both Tinker and Fraser. Applying Tinker, the court
determined that there was no actual “substantial disruption,” which was not
disputed by the school district, and that there was also no reasonable basis
for the school to forecast a disruption. 37 The student’s profile was set to
“private,” it did not identify the school or principle by name, the profile was

32
33
34
35
36
37
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Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
Id. at 406.
650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 928–30.
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so outrageous that it could not be taken seriously, and the school’s computers
blocked MySpace.38
Fraser, the court determined, could also not support liability because
Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech: “the Supreme Court
emphasized that Fraser’s speech would have been protected had he delivered
it outside the school.”39 The court was also not swayed by the argument that
the speech made its way to campus after the principal printed the profile and
brought it to campus.40
Snyder teaches two important lessons. First, Tinker’s application to
online speech depends on a reasonable forecast that the speech will disrupt
the physical campus. Second, Fraser simply does not apply off campus.
In Doninger v. Niehoff, school administrators punished a high school
student’s online speech by preventing her from running for class secretary.41
The student, Doninger, had become frustrated by the administration’s
interference in the scheduling of a battle of the bands event.42 The offending
online speech included both a publicly available blog post43 and an email,
sent from the school’s computer lab, asking various students and parents to
contact the administration and advocate for the event.44
As part of their decision upholding the district court, which signed off
on the school district’s punishment, the Second Circuit panel considered the
question of whether the record presented a triable matter of fact as to whether
Doninger’s off-campus speech created a material and substantial disruption
under Tinker.45 The court developed several factors to consider, including:
(1) Doninger’s potentially disturbing language, (2) misleading or false
information in the blog post,46 (3) a “deluge of phone calls and emails,”47 (4)
“several disrupted schedules,” and (5) several apparently disturbed
students.48
These factors suggest two basic rationales for policing online speech,
both of which are familiar. First, factors 3, 4, and 5 suggest that Doninger’s
offline speech hampered the ability of other members of the school
community to perform their usual duties. Factors 1 and 2, however, have
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 929.
Id. at 932.
Id.
642 F.3d 334, 339–42 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 348 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 349.
Id.
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little to do with any actual forecast of disruption. Instead, they suggest that
Doninger was not acting in good faith, and that the speech was therefore less
worthy of protection.
In Ex rel Layshock—another case relating to a parody social media
profile—a panel of the Third Circuit complicated online speech analysis by
refusing to apply Doninger absent a showing of substantial disruption.49 The
court expressed doubt that Doninger’s penalty was above constitutional
board: “we do not suggest that we agree with that court’s conclusion that the
student’s out of school expressive conduct was not protected by the First
Amendment there.”50
Layshock posited two enduring challenges to Tinker analysis. First, how
should courts weigh the reasonableness of a forecast of substantial disruption
absent a real showing in the record? Second, the Layshock court introduced
a sliding scale where the speech is weighed against the punishment. Barring
a run for student council is one thing, but a suspension improperly infringed
on the First Amendment.
Courts, then, are in disagreement about how, when, and even if Tinker
applies to online speech—a disagreement that Mahanoy does little to resolve.
The lack of a clear standard has forced courts to draw different lines and
adopt approaches that seem ad hoc and inconsistent.
II. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
The problem of online student speech is well covered in scholarly
literature, but far too often that scholarship focuses on the relation between
speech and a physical schoolhouse. Even those approaches that make no
mention of a physical school rely on one implicitly or propose solutions that
would not function in a totally online context.
Philip Lee has identified five basic analytical approaches that courts
have taken to analyze online student speech: (1) some courts have found that
schools enjoy no authority to police online speech, (2) some courts treat offcampus speech as identical to on-campus speech, (3) some courts require
schools to establish a nexus between off-campus speech and one or more
members of the school community, (4) some courts employ a reasonability
standard as to whether off-campus speech will reach campus, and (5) some
courts hold that schools can only police threats.51

49

Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id.
51
Philip Lee, Evading the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the Regulation of
Cyberbullying, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 848 (2016).
50
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The nexus test, Lee’s third category, is the only one of the five that both
ignores geography and attempts a fact-specific analysis. But even within the
broad category of nexus tests, important differences exist. Lee defines nexus
tests as treating “online expression as on-campus speech when it is made off
campus, but either aimed at a specific school or subsequently brought to or
accessed on campus.”52 For Lee, the physical school can help create a nexus,
but is by no means necessary.
Some scholars have advanced a “curricular nexus test” for policing
online speech on college campuses.53 Under this test, schools would need to
“to demonstrate a legitimate curricular or pedagogical justification to restrict
independent student speech.”54 However, these justifications could well go
beyond the kind of curricular justification in Hazelwood. The authors, for
example, cite the curricular justifications for professionalism standards:
“courts have generally recognized heightened institutional authority to
regulate college student speech . . . triggering curricular concerns, such as
the enforcement of professionalism standards.”55
Policing online speech as a curricular concern, justified by the need for
schools to teach professional standards as part of their curriculum, offers a
compelling basis outside of the school’s physical location. However, it also
offers potential pitfalls that might limit its applicability. For example,
curricular justifications cannot constitute a broad mandate to police any
online speech that administrators find distasteful.
The inquiry requires an administrator to tie any censorship to a standard
of which the students have sufficient notice and that actually operates in a
given professional community. For example, in Tatro v. University of
Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld punishment for Facebook
posts that violated student conduct rules and professionalism standards for a
mortuary science program. 56 The opinion cited an amicus brief by the
American Board of Funeral Service Education endorsing the school’s
conduct code. 57 Tying censorship to clearly-articulated standards of
community norms, like those of the ABFSE, prevents schools from
exercising authority arbitrarily, gives students fair warning of speech
standards, and ensures that any imposed rules are narrowly-tailored.58

52

Id. at 852.
Jeffrey C. Sun, Neal H. Hutchens & James D. Breslin, A (Virtual) Land of Confusion with College
Students’ Online Speech: Introducing the Curricular Nexus Test, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 49, 51 (2013).
54
Id. at 52.
55
Id. at 65.
56
Id. at 81–85 (citing Tatro v. Univ. of Minnesota, 816 N.W.2d 509, 509 (Minn. 2012)).
57
Id. at 83.
58
See id. at 85.
53
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The above survey shows that any workable framework should try to
properly weigh the interests of students, teachers, and administrators, instead
of favoring one group and disregarding the others. It should focus on
curriculum rather than physical location. Still, tying online behavior to
curriculum requires something analogous to a professionalism component.
This does not mean teaching first graders to curate their LinkedIn profiles; it
means developing and circulating standards for students to engage
productively in the public square.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. The Public Employee Framework in Schools
My proposal for addressing student speech online is to abandon the
framework of Tinker, while maintaining its ideals of citizenship, public
debate, and equal access to education. In place of Tinker’s framework, I
propose adopting a version of Connick/Pickering analysis.59 In applying the
public employee framework to school speech, it will be important to remain
mindful of the crucial differences between the two groups. For example,
students cannot change schools when their speech rights are not respected.
Further, public employee speech can educate the public in a way that student
speech rarely does. Nonetheless, adapting the public employee framework
harmonizes the citizenship rationale of Tinker with the non-geographical
principles announced in Mahanoy.
In Pickering, the Court considered whether a school district could
dismiss a teacher for a critical letter that was published in the local
newspaper. The Court rested its decision largely on the public importance of
school funding and on the teacher’s informed perspective. 60 The only
limitation the Court placed on this protection was when the speaker made
defamatory statements known to be false or with reckless disregard for the
truth.61
In Connick v. Myers, the Court further refined the framework for public
employee speech by distinguishing speech made in the course of performing
one’s official duties.62 In that case, the Court considered the dismissal of a
district attorney after she circulated a questionnaire “soliciting the views of
her fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale,
59
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1982); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205,
Will Cty., IL, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
60
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.
61
Id. at 573 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968)).
62
461 U.S. at 166–67.
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the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors,
and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”63 The
Court concluded that Myers’s speech was, largely, not a matter of public
concern.64 As such, Myers’s speech was not entitled to full First Amendment
protections and fared poorly under Pickering’s balancing test. 65 Myers’s
speech on a limited, private concern was not sufficient to outweigh her public
employer’s interest in an effectively-run workplace.
To this framework, the Court added an important exception in Garcetti
v. Ceballos for employee speech made pursuant to an employee’s official
duties.66 The case involved a deputy district attorney who suffered several
adverse employment actions after questioning the legitimacy of an affidavit,
writing a memo to that effect, and testifying about his doubts in court.67 The
Court specifically distinguished the case from precedent on the grounds that
the memo was within Ceballos’ official duties.68
The key question, then, in applying the Garcetti test, is what speech
counts as part of a speaker’s official duties? 69 Is speech produced in an
official job somehow government speech, which the employer created and
can therefore control?70 Or is some speech better characterized as an aspect
of job performance than it is speech, and not protected on that ground?71
In trying to apply Garcetti to a school speech, the second reading is
more natural. In many ways, schools already exert significant control over
work product. If a student writes a bad essay and gets a D, nobody argues
that their First Amendment rights are at risk. But if the government prevents
that student from publishing or disseminating the essay, it is clearly an
infringement.
Indeed, the narrow focus on work product is likely the Court’s true
intention in Garcetti. Kermit Roosevelt identifies six different quotes from
the opinion supporting the work-product interpretation, and notes that
“nothing in the facts or reasoning of Garcetti require us to push any farther.”72
63

Id. at 141.
The only exception was Myers’s speech about whether or not district attorneys were pressured to
work on political campaigns. Id. at 149.
65
Id. at 154 (“The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that Connick
tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and
destroy close working relationships.”).
66
See 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
67
Id. at 414–15.
68
Id. at 411.
69
Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 631, 635 (2012).
70
Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 646.
64
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This narrow reading of Garcetti is particularly adaptable to the Internet
because it focuses on statements produced while performing tasks, rather
than statements made in a particular physical location. If one student bullies
another student in a classroom, they should expect sanctions for that speech;
the same should be true in the online classroom.73
The most salient difference between student speech and public
employee speech is that public employees, unlike students, work at their own
pleasure; they can quit at any point. It follows that any attempt to repurpose
Connick/Pickering should relax speech limitations to account for students’
inability to sign off on those limitations in advance.
A second tension between the two systems is the latitude afforded to
speech on a matter of public concern.74 It is not clear that the private/public
distinction maps cleanly onto school speech. Specifically, the public does
not benefit from a student’s contributions to an open debate in the same way
that it does from contributions of public employees, which presumably come
with an insider’s vantage point and expertise.75
Furthermore, how public is public? The United States’ involvement in
the Vietnam War is undeniably a matter of public concern, but what about a
cancelled battle of the bands?76 If schools are supposed to provide a training
ground for civic debate—a functional democracy in miniature—it seems fair
to assume that the public concerns of the school community should be
afforded similar protections as the public concerns of society at large. If the
debate over a battle of the bands helps teach students how to debate matters

73

Under a system like the one described here, courts would need to define the boundaries of student
work product. Under the current regime, courts use a variety of methods to determine if online speech
causes a substantial disruption on campus, often either a foreseeability test or a nexus test. Lee, supra
note 51, at 848–58. An analogous inquiry for work product would need to contend with questions about
what kinds of posts constitute student work product, and whether speech affecting work product should
receive protection. For example, does a direct message between students who are working together on a
class project constitute work product? What about cyberbullying on Facebook that prevents its victim
from creating their own work product?
74
Recall that Tinker focused on substantial disruption as the applicable legal standard but placed
considerable emphasis on the importance of the “marketplace of ideas” within schools, and on the vital
need to protect constitutional freedoms in schools so that students can be exposed to a wide range of
ideas. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
75
According to the Pickering Court: “Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools
should be spent.” Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., IL, 391 U.S. 563, 572
(1968).
76
The Second Circuit might have thought so: they cited an opinion highlighting the importance of
allowing debate on matters important to the school community. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334,
347 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13
(2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
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of national significance someday, then administrators should try to facilitate
that process as much as possible.
B. Tinker and Citizenship
One way to facilitate productive debate is by teaching professionalism.
In Tatro, professionalism formed the nexus between online speech and the
curriculum of a professional school. This solution to the curricular nexus test
does not fit well into the K-12 context, both because that kind of schooling
does not prepare students for a particular profession, and because there is no
professional association that can vouch for any standards as genuine.
Yet school speech cases make clear that public schools do have a
preparatory function beyond history and arithmetic—citizenship. Mahanoy’s
third principle—protecting unpopular speech—is rooted in this traditional
free speech rationale.77 In this light, citizenship is akin to professionalism.
Both involve teaching and reinforcing behavior rather than information.
Both focus on student’s lives after graduation. And both, at least to some
extent, can be reduced to a series of rules.
The rules at issue in Tatro were apparently approximations of the
standards that professional morticians try to uphold. They were verified as
accurate by ABFSE, but not adopted from that organization. This makes
sense, since a school may want to instill a higher ethical standard than the
bare minimum established by a professional organization. The same logic
could be applied to public schools’ citizenship mandate. One could imagine
a school adopting a code of citizenship that serves a similar function to
ethical standards in professional schools. In both instances, the point is not
to mirror the real-world standards exactly, but to educate and inculcate
students with certain standards of behavior.
Schools should ensure that standards of citizenship comport with the
vision of Tinker, including the rights of non-speakers to avoid disruption and
the fostering of democratic values. Tinker did not promote curricular
citizenship generally, but a particular form of curricular citizenship that
helped schools run more efficiently by focusing less on the rights of the
speaker.
Therefore, a true return to the spirit of Tinker involves a return to a
conception of the First Amendment that is, as Genevieve Lakier has put it,
antisubordinating. 78 For Lakier, the Supreme Court changed its First
Amendment jurisprudence during the 1970s, from protecting “the
77

Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021) (“America’s public
schools are the nurseries of democracy.”).
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Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117
(2018).
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marginalized and the disenfranchised” to “a tool of economic deregulation
and corporate power.”79 Before this shift, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment’s “guarantee of expressive liberty is a guarantee of expressive
equality—that freedom of speech means not only the right to speak but the
right to speak on equal terms as other speakers.”80 According to Lakier, since
the 1970’s, the Court has read the First Amendment’s equality guarantee to
require only “formally equal treatment at the government’s hands.”81
Under Lakier’s thesis, then, the Tinker court’s conception of the
interrelated system of school administration, curricular citizenship, and
student speech may be quite different than the conception of modern courts.
One area in which the Court’s subordinating turn is particularly apparent is
the area of public employee speech. For Lakier, Garcetti is emblematic of
this broader shift. 82 Garcetti represents an effort by the Court to place
government employees on equal footing with private employers, who are
free to premise adverse employment actions on speech that happens within
an employee’s duties.83
Yet, in appealing to equality between private and public employers, the
Court interpreted the First Amendment to exacerbate inequality in other
areas “by ignoring important economic, political, or—in this case—
institutional differences between the groups it equates for purposes of First
Amendment analysis.” 84 This case, along with other cases like Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, evince a trend away from liberty
and towards a certain kind of equality.85 But in so doing, it runs counter to
Tinker, which recognized an antisubordinating First Amendment as crucial
to citizenship as it should be taught to students. Lakier’s reading suggests
that Garcetti should be read narrowly in order to comport with Tinker.
C. A Proposed Framework
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, any workable standard for
student speech online should attempt to tie together several distinct threads.
Student work-product should not be afforded significant—if any—
constitutional protection. Standards should be tied to the school’s function
of teaching citizenship. That citizenship should be read in context to support
an antisubordinating First Amendment: one that ensures everyone is able to
79
80
81
82
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84
85
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speak and participate in conversation, rather than protecting individual
speakers from government censorship. Other school actors should be free to
perform their own duties, absent substantial disruption. Finally, part of
citizenship involves robust debate on matters of public concern.
In general, the public employee framework provides a useful guide for
sorting out these overlapping and conflicting interests. After Garcetti, the
public employee framework essentially proceeds by asking two separate
questions. First, was the employee acting as a citizen or performing their job?
Speech is protected, but job performance is not. Next, it weighs the public
interest in speech against the government’s interest in running an efficient
workplace.
A school speech framework should ask slight variations on the same
two questions. Students enjoy no protection for what they write in a
homework assignment, but they do enjoy protection when talking to their
friends on the weekend. So, the first question I propose is whether a given
student’s speech was in the course of their official duties as a student. Again,
many situations will be less than clear cut, but the rule should, like Garcetti,
be narrowly interpreted in order to remain properly antisubordinating.
Unlike Garcetti, however, for school speech, this inquiry serves to
establish whether the school has any say over the student’s speech:
protection is the rule, rather than the exception. In Garcetti, speech in the
course of official duties is unprotected, and other speech is subject to
balancing. In order to account for students’ broader rights than those of atwill employees, speech in the course of their duties as students should be
subject to balancing, whereas speech at home is protected.86 This is already
implicit in Mahanoy’s focus on the responsibility of parents to police most
student speech outside of school.87
The second inquiry, then, is whether the speech at issue furthers the
school’s goal of teaching citizenship. In considering this question, courts and
schools should weigh several factors. Did the speech cause a substantial
disruption? Did the speech impede others’ access to the educational
experience? Are the standards of citizenship consistent with the school’s
86

Protecting speech at home from discipline at school, however, should not protect it from any
consequences whatsoever. For example, the proposed framework here would not allow a high school to
discipline a student about an offensive or inappropriate Facebook post, so long as it did not interfere with
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educational goal? Most importantly, was the speech on a matter of public or
private concern?
Still, the public benefits less from student speech on public concerns
than they do from public employees. Yet, as in Tinker, allowing students to
contribute productively to public debate fulfills part of schools’ curricular
citizenship mission. Since the function here is curricular and not informing
the public, speech on matters of school-wide significance should likely
weigh in favor of protection.
D. A Student Speech Controversy During COVID
Several student speech controversies have emerged during the COVID19 pandemic. One in particular demonstrates the utility of a duty-based
approach to student speech.
In a high-profile case in Dallas, Georgia, a high school student took and
posted a photograph of a packed hallway in her high school. 88 The
photograph was taken on the first day of the fall semester, when students had
not been to school since shutting down for the COVID-19 pandemic in
March of 2020.89 There were few masks to be seen, and little evidence that
students or administrators were taking social distancing guidelines
seriously. 90 The photos eventually went viral, coming “to symbolize a
chaotic first week back in U.S. classrooms.” 91 The student was initially
suspended for five days, but the suspension was eventually reversed after her
mother filed a grievance.92
This case raises questions about where a student’s duties as a student
begin and end. Measured temporally, perhaps a student’s speech can be
censored during the school day. But that would not cover a good deal of
possible student speech in asynchronous learning situations. Could Tinker’s
geographical focus be maintained as part of the official duties inquiry?
In either case, there is little indication that posting the photo
substantially interfered with the administration’s ability to run their school.
In fact, the opposite is true. The superintendent made clear that he would not
change any rules or enforcement on campus: “Wearing a mask is a personal
88
Giulia McDonnell & Nieto Del Rio, ‘The Photo Does Not Look Good’: Georgia School’s Crowded
Halls Go Viral and Suspension of the Student Who Posted the Photos Lifted, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 7,
2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-nw-nyt-georgia-hallway-picturesuspension-20200807-oz6rqzltr5hjbettpx62wnymoe-story.html
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choice, and there is no practical way to enforce a mandate to wear them.”93
The speech is also on a matter of public concern. The student was quick to
defend her actions in similar terms: “My mom has always told me that she
won’t get mad at us if we get in trouble as long as it’s ‘good trouble.’”94
Further, the extent to which the picture took off online is testament to its
centrality in an ongoing public debate.
Under the proposed framework, this speech would likely be protected,
which accords nicely with the ideals of Tinker: students should be allowed
to weigh in on issues of national importance when doing so does not disrupt
the school’s ability to operate. The first question is whether the speech was
part of the student’s duties as a student. She was in the hallway, moving
between classes, which she would not have been doing absent her duty to
attend class. So, perhaps this is within the range of duties associated with
being a student, but not amounting to student work product. But the second
question weighs in favor of protection, because the student was speaking on
a matter of obvious public concern. This is exactly the sort of speech that an
anti-subordinating First Amendment should protect: dissenting speech that
does not affect other school actors from fulfilling their own duties.
CONCLUSION
The tension between school speech and online speech became
especially pronounced during the COVID-19 pandemic, but there is little
reason to suspect it will be resolved by the end of the pandemic. Even when
all schools return to their pre-pandemic in-person capacity, students,
teachers, and administrators will have been exposed to any number of online
learning tools and some will inevitably catch on.95 Even those online tools
that compliment in-person instruction will continue the trend of moving
instruction (and therefore student speech) online. 96 In its December 2018
report on The Future of Schools, the design and consulting firm Arup Group
identified the effect of technology “integrated in school and at home” as one
of six key trends affecting schools in the future.97 The same report further
identified cyberbullying as an area of concern that would grow as technology
forces more student speech online. 98 The COVID-19 pandemic only
93
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accelerated the process of moving student speech online and outside the
remit of the Tinker decision.
Tinker established an ideal for translating First Amendment rights to
the classroom. Mahanoy announced certain abstract principles for resolving
student speech cases but failed to explain how those principles overlap with
Tinker. The Tinker court, of course, never contemplated facts presented in
cases involving online speech—facts that have become increasingly
commonplace. The framework proposed here maintains Tinker’s ideals, and
layers them onto the existing framework for public employee speech. It also
endeavors to ground an online student speech framework clearly in Supreme
Court precedent, rather than abstract principles.
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